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IN THE SUPREME COURT' 
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH 
PO!{('~ ~~ 1 1 ~ 1•: RES. ERYO IR l'O ;\[~ ) 
I .:\7\ 't . a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Rrsponrlfnf, 
vs. 
LLOYD\\'. KELLER CORPOH1\- i 
T I ():\'".a corporation~ A YON LA~D Case N °· 
. \ 7\ D L I \"ESTOCI\: CO ~1 PAN y, I n~HH 
a corporation~ H. A. SUM~lERS,·) 
anrl C L E L L 1\ S U ~l~IERS, his 
wife: II. A. S l T~I~IERS, JR., and 
~IHS. ll. ... \ .. SF)I~IERS .TR .. his 
wife, J IJrfcndants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
This is an action in eminent dmnain, the defendants 
representing three different interests and all three in-
lrrr~ts were tried sin1ultaneously before the court and 
.iury at one sitting. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
'fhe three cases were tried before a jury. There 
were three special verdicts rendered by the jury. Each 
Yerdict was composed of two parts: ( 1) the value of 
the land taken and, ( 2) severance damages. On two 
of these verdicts the severance damages awarded were 
less than the amounts testified to by any witness. The 
defendants moved for a new trial. The court, on motion 
of the plaintiff, by the theory of additur, attempted to 
add sufficient monies to the severance damage in each 
of the two cases so as to bring the severance damage 
to the 1ninimum testimony of any witness at said hear 
ing, the result being that the judgment entered in the 
one case was based upon the jury's verdict, but, the 
amended judgment entered in the other two cases was 
based upon the court's verdict. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek an order from this court vacating 
the judgments in all three cases and directing that a 
new trial be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Porcupine Reservoir Company, a corporation, 
being a private corporation of the state of Utah, sought 
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to condemn certain lands belonging to the defendants 
in Cache County. A fee simple title was sought in and 
to the reserYoir area and an easement was sought where 
tht· di,·crting works would be situated. The defendants, 
through their counsel, requested separate trials and 
... aid request was denied by the court. The jury ·was 
impanelled to hear all three cases simultaneously. The 
property owners and two expert witnesses, Thomas 
Baum and I Iaven Barlow, testified as to Yalue and 
damages for the defendants. Two witnesses, Alden 
Adams and ~Iarcrllus Palmer, testified as to da1nages 
and value for the plaintiff. The testimony of all wit-
tlr~ses as to Yalue and damages, by stipulation of coun-
srl. was reduced to exhibits and received in evidence. 
The eases took five ( 5) days to try with exhibits num-
bering one (I) to sixty-three ( 63) inclusive being of-
fered. The jury retired for its deliberations and in less 
than two hours returned its verdict, but, in two of the 
three cases, brought in a verdict on severance da1nages 
for less than that testified to by any witness. 
ARGUlVIENT 
POINT I. 
TH.AT THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFEXDAXTS' REQUEST FOR SEPARATE 
TRIALS. 
The record is silent as to the official request made 
that separate trials be granted but on (R. 236) we 
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have the decision of the court In regard to the same, 
which is: 
''The court: It would be the same thing as to 
~Ir. Keller. We're trying them all together now. 
No such thing as separate lawsuits. \Ve simply 
haven't got the time to try them separately." 
This is the answer given by the court to defendants' 
request, which evidently was made off the record, that 
defendants have the matters tried separately. The court, 
as you see~ absolutely foreclosed the defendants from 
separate trials. When the court did so, this situation 
resulted: There were three separate parties with their 
separate interests in this lawsuit, with problems arising 
in different directions; a jury of lay people are brought 
in who are forced off from their jobs and in some cases 
are resentful, and then attempt to feed into them the 
separate problems of each of the defendants, who are 
having their property taken away from them against 
their will; you atten1pt to explain and picture to them, 
the damages that will accrue to each of the defendants, 
put on an expert witness who talks about one case for 
a few minutes, changes over and talks about another 
and then changes over and talks about the third and 
then you come back and cross examine him on each 
of these cases on which he has given testimony. It be· 
con1es mentally impossible for the jury to grasp, sepa-
rate and comprehend the various problems presented 
to them. You couple the foregoing with the objections 
that counsel from both sides make from time to time, 
the rulings either for or against the objections made. 
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Tlwn nrld to that the problen1 of the total anwunt of 
mom·y and dam anTs. This a 1l becomes cuinulatiYe and 
• M 
-.tnggering in the minds of the jury. The rights of each 
imliritlunl are lost track of and in their place is the 
rumulatin· figure which the jury instinctively holds 
:1~:till'il each inrlividual. 
Then you add and create another proble1n in this: 
Th<' Kclkrs' ~·car :tnmud operation is extensiYe and 
must he shown and explained to the .i ury. It is natural 
t'or the jury to helieY<· that the 1\:ellers are extren1ely 
well-to-<lo berat1sc of their vast holdings. Defendants 
str<llt.~·l~· feel in this case that the jury made up their 
minds to sec that the mnount awarded to the l{ellers 
'ras held to a minimum, and in their desire to carry this 
out they even lowered it below the Ininimum. 
l ask this question: llow n1uch of that den1onstrated 
resentment. when three cases <He being tried before the 
,iury, might be carried over mio the other cases? Then 
you are also faced with this: If you have an indifferent 
jury you are stuck with the1n for all three cases. The 
jury certainly proved its indifference when, with sixty-
three ( 63) exhibits and five ( 5) days of testimony, it 
could sit down and determine the rights of three differ-
ent litigants in less than two (:?) hours. The onh~ 
rlefrndnnt who was awarded n1ore seYerance dan1ag~s 
than the minimun1 testimony was a widow lady and 
her snn: the other two defendants were completely 
disregarded. It is the contention of the defendants 
thnt to force three defendants into one trial in an eminent 
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dmnain proceeding because the court adopts the atti-
tude, "we simply haven't got the time to try them sepa· 
rately" is a far cry from justice. Defendants submit 
that to try three lawsuits of this nature simultaneously 
is not equitable, is not fair and is unjudicious. The 
defendants further contend that to be forced to try 
their cases in this manner is an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED "\VHEN IT 
DENIED DEFENDANTS' ~-lOTION FOR A 
NE\V TRI~~; .BASE~~A_P~QlJ~tv 
D.t\.MAGE~ ARDEDJ\ IN T'VOo'FTHE 
THREE CASES -w-HICH WERE TRIED SI-
l\IULTANEOUSLY, \VERE LESS THAN THE 
TESTI~ION1:- OF 1\.NY 'VITNESS. 
\Ve have tabulated below the testimony of each 
and every witness, insofar as the value of the land taken, 
severance damage and total, and have listed the jury 
verdict under each of the titles of the defendants so 
that the court can see at a glance the result of the five 
( 5) days' testimony and the jury verdict, and it is as 
follows: 
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I kr<'tHbJII Keller Corporation 
Land Taken Severance Total 
I",,#~ (}\\lllT·s lcslimon\· 
(dcf) *1 t.,t)l().oo $18.000.00 $32,670.00 
1:.\ # ;;,-,;, II a \Ttl Barlow 
(dcf) 11.DOO.OO 
1:., :: :~H -Thomas Baun1 
(dd') ]],]!lt.()O 
1•:, #~::a. 1.:~1, .\lden ,\dams 
(pi) :!.1~l.).00 
1•: \ # :,i ~ Ia n:cllus Pahner 
( pl) :.?.:!R7 .. ~.o 
1\n· .. Jury \' crd iet a.fl(i0.00 
8,250.00 
I 0.:! ~0.00 
3,884.20 
"~,85;").25 
:).;!00.00 
l)Pfenda n t --Sun1n1ers 
K, ,: :HI. :to;,, ::ol, 0" iHTS tcstin1ony 
( def) *H.:n2.00 $15,712.00 
F.\ :::lli. :Ilia. ;)tih --HaYen Barlow 
( def) 9.1~7".00 11,130.00 
J.:, #;17 - Thmnas Baun1 
( det') 7.706.00 14,884.00 
Ex tttk1. ~~h -,\ldPit ~\darns 
(pl) 1,641.10 
F. x :t :,~l -:Jlarcellus Pahner 
( pl) 1.:226.10 
Ht'(' . .Tnry Yenlict 2.879.00 
5,18J..OO 
2,009.00 
.5,680.00 
20,150.00 
21,1·34.00 
6,080.00 
7.115.00 
6,863.00 
$25,084.00 
20,317.00 
22,317.00 
6,825.00 
3,235.00 
8,559.00 
l)efendant-- .:\Yon Land and LiYestock Company 
Ex ~=l-t, :: Ia. 34b-HaYen Barlow 
( def) $6,81 '~.00 $1.732.00 
E' = :;q -Thomas Bamn 
( def) 6,450.00 
F." # t:!a, ~:?h -.Alden Adams 
( pl) 2 .-t:~f).40 
F. x # .-,~ -' r arcellus Palmer 
( pl) 1.550.90 
J\q· . .T ury Yerdict a,6i8.00 
7 
3,128.00 
2000.34 
1,732.66 
1,57 ~.00 
$8,5J6.00 
~.758.00 
~,450.00 
3,285.00 
.'5,2t}2.00 
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The court will notice that in the tabulation of the 
Keller Corporation, the jury verdict for severance dam-
ages was $3,200.00. The minimun1 severance damage 
testified to by any witness was that of Alden Adams, 
a witness for the plaintiff of $3,884.20. 
In the Avon Land and Livestock Company tabu-
lation the jury verdict for severance was $1,574<.00. 
The minimum testimony of two people was that of 
~1arcellus Palmer for $1,732.66 and Haven Barlow 
for $1,732.00. Mr. Adams in this case, however, testi-
fied $2,000.34, yet he was the witness in the Keller 
case that was low, l\ir. Palmer, in the Keller case, being 
nearly $1,000.00 higher. 
The defendants believe that when the jury re-
turned a verdict contrary to the evidence and lower than 
the testimony of any witness, it was shown on the face 
of it that there was error in the form of influence of 
passion or prejudice, or of refusal of the jury to follow 
the court's instructions. In any event there was no evi-
dence which would justify the verdict. The defendants 
assert, as a matter if right under such verdict, it was 
the court's duty to grant a new trial in all three cases. 
Defendants further believe that a new trial should 
be gran ted in all three cases for the reason that if the 
jury demonstrated in two cases, either passion or preju-
dice, or refusal to follow the instructions of the court 
that this is prima facie evidence that the same disregard 
of the rights of the defendants, in some degree, was 
carried into the other case. Inasmuch as the law, in re-
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gnrcl to Po in I II, and the cases which will be cited in 
l'~~inl Ill, will be applieable to both points, counsel 
feels it would he wis<' to list Point III and giYe the cases 
und lt':xt. then \\T will have n1utual application. 
POIXT III 
TII.\T TI-lE COCHT EHRED \YIIEX IT 
.\I>OPTED PL.\l~TIFF'S THEORY OF AD-
I>l'l'rH. S.\ID ERROR BEING AS FOLLO,VS: 
(a) Tl L\.T I X 1\ ST.ATFTOR\r CONDE~l­
\ .\TIOX PHOCEEDTXGS, THE TAI\:ING OF 
llEFI·~XI>.\XT'S PROPERTY IS PROTECTED 
BY THE l'OXSTITl TTION AND STATUTES 
\\'HICI-1 ~ICST BE STRICTLY CO~IPLIED 
\\"ITH. 
(b) TIL\T THERE IS NO STATUTORY 
PROYISIOX FOR ADDITlJR IX CONDE)l-
X .\TIOX PROCEEDINGS. 
(e) TilE COl 'HT lTSl"'RPED THE DE-
FEXDi\XTs· COXSTITUTIOXAL A X D 
ST.\Tl-TOR\ ... TRIAL BY Jl~RY AND Sl~B­
STITlTTED A XE\Y. '""ERDICT BY THE 
l'OlTRT \YITII THE AID, COXSEXT AND 
HE(~l- EST OF THE PL.AIXTIFF OXL Y. 
The Statutes invoh-ed are as follows: Article 1 
' Section :.?:.! of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
reads: 
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uS ec. 22. Priz'ate property for public usc: Pri-
Yate property shall not be taken or dmnaged for 
public use without just cmnpensation." 
Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads: 
uSee. 78-34-10, Compensation and dantaye8-
I-l ow as.Ye.'~sed.-The court, jury or referee must 
hear such legal eYidence as may be offered by 
any of the parties to the proceedings, and there-
upon must ascertain and assess: 
( 1) The value of the property sought to be 
condetnned and all improvements thereon apper-
taining to the realty, and of each and eYery sepa-
rate estate or interest therein; and if it consists 
of different parcels, the value of each parcel and 
of each estate or interest therein shall be sepa-
rately assessed. 
( 2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its sever-
ance fron1 the portion sought to be condemned 
and the construction of the improvement in the 
1uanner proposed by the plaintiff. 
(3) --------------------------------
( 4) ··-·----------------------------
( 5) As far as practicable cmnpensation must 
be assessed for each source of dan1ages sepa-
rately." 
.A.rticle 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah reads 
as follows: 
uSee. 10, Trial hN jur,71: In capital cases the 
right. of trial by jury shall retnain inYiolate. In 
10 
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.1!! 
{·marts ol' "TtH·ral J·urisdiction, except in capital h • . I 
cases. a j 11 n· ... hall consist of eight .Jurors. n 
courts or'inf~·rior jurisdiction a jury shall consist 
of four j ur<H·s. In critninal cases the Yenl ict shall 
he unat;imnlts. in civil cases three-fourth of the 
j 11 rors nw ,. find a verdict. j \ .i ury in eivil cases 
~hall he w~1in:d unless dnuat11lcd." 
In the case hct'otT the court a denwnd for a jury 'vas 
made and the jury l'cc paid, and as a consequence the 
defendants were entitled to their trial by jury. Rule 
::s of the Ftah Hules of ('i,·il Procedure reads: 
"(a) Hi:tlti Prcsl'I"'Ccd. The right of trial by 
,iury as declared hy the Constitution or as given 
by statute shalllw preserYcd to the parties." 
Hule :l~l of the ( · tah Rules of Civil Procedure reads: 
" (a) JJy Jury. \Yhen trial by jury has been 
demawled as pnnrided in Hule 38, the action shall 
he dcsigna ted upon the register of actions as a 
jury action .... " 
l'ounsel has searched in Yain, but there is no statute 
providing for additur by the court to the jury verdict. 
\\' e do have the constitutional provision that private 
property shall not be taken, however, without just 
compensation. \\' e do have the provision that we haYe 
a right to trial by jury. \Ve do have a rule that says a 
jury trial shall be preserved. En1inent domain proceed-
i11g~. such as we have in the case before the court are 
st ridly statutory in nature and do not exist as a com-
mon law action. That is to say. without a statutory en-
actment there would be no such action as eminent 
domain. Consequently, we haYe this query: If the jury's 
11 
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verdict is less than the testimony of any witness, and the 
court so recognizes it, has the court the right in the 
State of Utah to say, the jury made a mistake in its 
verdict, but I have the right to substitute my theory of 
additur? Does the court, by such a theory, take away 
the defendants' right to trial by jury? Can it say, 
whether you like it or not, you'll now have a trial by 
the court? There is no case in the State of Utah exactly 
in point, certainly not the case of Boden vs. Suhrmann, 
327 P2d 826, which involved a common law action and 
not a proceeding in e1ninent domain. There are, how· 
ever~ a great number of cases in other states, which .do 
have application. First, I want to quote from Nichols 
on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Vol. 5, page 101: 
"Where, however, the amount of the award is 
not supported by any evidence and is, in fact, 
contrary to the evidence adduced at the trial, the 
appellate court may set aside the award even 
though the a ward is based in part on a view of 
the pren1ises by the triers of the facts.'.' (See nu· 
merous cases cited) . 
Continuing on page 104 of the same volume, we have: 
" ... If outside the range of the testimony 
such a wards have generally been set aside." See 
nun1erous cases cited) . 
Further quoting from page 107 under the title, "In· 
crease or reduction of award," we have the following: 
" ... Generally, however, in the absence of ex· 
press statntor.lJ authority the trial court is with· 
out power to increa.~e or di1ninish the amount of 
tltc 'lcard as determined by the Jury or by com· 
12 
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11/l.'i.'i/OfltTs. In conden1nation proceedings the 
trial judge has not th~ power of control over tJle 
procec(lings ancl Ycnhcts possessed by the trial 
judge in comtnon~law actions. He may, of cou~se, 
('ontirm or set aside the award reported to him, 
hut he cannot give binding instructions, and the 
jury is the judge of both law and facts. ender 
our eonsl:itutional provisions if the judge reaches 
the conclusion that the award is excessive, he may 
not hitnself reduce the a·ward and as so reduced 
eonfirn1 it. Under such circumstances he should 
refuse to confirn1, and order a new trial. It is the 
constitutional right of an owner in most juris-
dictions nut only to receive just compensation 
for the property taken from him, _but also to 
htn·e the atnount of that cmnpensation awarded 
to hitn by a jury. If the court changes the amount 
of the verdict in the absence and without the 
consent of the jur~·, or the parties, there is a new 
verdict rendered, not by a jury, but by a court 
acting without a jury. This is violative of the 
riyht.~ of the o·wncr becaztse, in the exercise of 
the power of eminent domain, which takes the 
property nf an o'lcner from him without his con-
sent. the limitations prescribed by the constitu-
tion should be strictly observed, and the statutes 
pw~.'ierl in p u rs u a nee thereof sho1tld be strictly 
complied 1.cith. The fact that the verdict does not 
co!lform to tl~e evidence, 01: is rendered through 
n1~stake and 1~1adver~ence, Is. a cause for setting 
a:\tde the verdict, or, If not discovered until after 
judgn1ent is entered, is a cause for setting aside 
both the verdict and judgment, but it does not 
gin' the court power to correct the verdict. The 
Yerdict is the jury's not the court's, and the power 
of th.e court in such case~ is limited to seeing that 
the Jurr return a verdict correct in form and 
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substance. It may not, after the verdict has been 
returned and the jury discharged, change it, over 
the objections of either of the parties, in, matters 
of substance." (See the great number of cases 
cited.) (Italics ours) . 
Quoting again on page 110 of the same volun1e under 
the heading "Inadequacy or Excessiveness of Award," 
we have: 
"As heretofore pointed out, where the report 
of the commissioners or the verdict of the jury 
is either inadequate or excessive, although the 
court is generally without power to modify the 
report or verdict, it may set such report or ver-
dict aside." (See nwnerous cases cited) . 
In the case of City of Grand Rapids vs. Coit, 113 N\V 
362, this is an action in Eminent Domain for the con-
demnation of certain land for a street. It is a case 
exactly in point, for the jury brought in a verdict for 
less than the testimony of any witness, and the court 
applied the theory of additur to bring the verdict within 
the testimony, and refused to grant a new trial. The 
appellate court, in reversing the lower said, said on 
page 363, righthand column: 
" . . . The lowest value placed by a witness 
upon the land known as Parcel #I was $335.00; 
the highest $1,195.30. The compensation award-
ed by the jury was $304.15. See Grand Rapi~s 
vs. Perkins, 78 ~Iichigan 93, 43 N\V 1037. This 
award the petitioner exercising the option given 
it by the court, consented to increase to the sum 
of $339.15. The theory of the attack upon n~­
dicts claimed to be excessive or inadequate IS 
14 
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that they arc not supported by evidence. r~he 
rrmc•h· is a new trial. The practice of refusing 
a new 'trial if the owrwr of the verdict will ren1it 
the reeo\Tl'\' to an amount which the e\·idence, 
in the jud~~nent of the trial court, will suppor~, 
is ott<' of loug standing. In cases where the cn-
demT afl'ords a standard or rule for calculating 
the sum which should be awarded, the practice, 
whether the verdict is excessive or is inadequate, 
is open to no objection. \Yhere the award de-
pends upon conflicting testi1nony, and especiaJly 
where the allowance to be made rests, of neces-
sity, in the sound judgment of the jur~·. this 
asserted and achnitted power of the courts is 
sparingly exercised. In any case, the one in whose 
favor the verdict is rendered is given the option 
to rctnit or subtnit the issue to another jury. The 
general rule is that. when a trial court deter-
mines that the datnages, awarded upon conflict-
ing evidence. are inadequate. a new trial will be 
granted. and that the court cannot render judg-
ment for an amount greater than the verdict; 
nor can a new trial be refused on condition that 
the defendant pay a sum fixed by the court. 14 
Ency. Pl & Pr 7t>5 ~ Lorf v. City of Detroit, 
1 ~.> ~Iieh. :?H5, 108 N.\Y. 661. In condemnation 
proceedings, the petitioner is not, as to the com-
pensation to be awarded, a plaintiff. The court 
was in error in refusing a new trial." 
In the matter of State v. llan1n1erquist, 293 X ,,V. 539, 
we han· a case of a default judgtnent being entered 
:1gainst the party. thereafter, a guardian was appointed 
pf the party and they petitioned that the judgment be 
~rt aside. The court then took it upon himself to in-
crt·nsr the verdict and made an order that unless the 
15 
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State paid the an1ount within sixty days that the default 
judgment would be set aside and the matter be tried. 
At the end of sixty ( 60) days the payment had not 
been made but the State sought an additional order 
granting an additional thirty ( 30) days. From this 
order an appeal was made. The court said on page 541, 
righthand column, as follows: 
"The order entered below operates to require 
the defendants to accept a compensation fixed 
by the court. This is an action involving a jury 
question a court is without authority to increase 
the verdict and thus substitute its finding for that 
of the jury, has been settled by this court. W al· 
ters Y. Gilham et ux., 52 S.D. 82, 216 N.W. 854. 
Our conclusion that the learned trial court erred 
in that respect in this proceeding might well rest 
upon that holding and the constitutional safe-
guard of the trial by jury from which it springs. 
Article VI, Section 6, Constitution of South 
Dakota. However, our constitution further pro· 
vides that 'Private property shall not be taken 
for public use, or damaged, without just com· 
pensation as determined by a jury.' Article VI, 
Section 13. The plain command of this specific 
limitation upon the exercise of the power of 
e1ninent domain concludes the issue. Such is the 
current of authority. In re Owen and Memorial 
Parks in City of Detroit, 244 Mich. 377, 221 
N.W. 279, 61 A.L.R. 190, 194, 18 Am. Jur. 
1108." 
In the case of Showalter v. State, 63 P2d 189, we have 
an Arizona case where the amount of the jury verdict 
was less than that testified to by plaintiff's own wit-
16 
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Jl('~sc·s. The court said on page 190, righthand column, 
as follows: 
.. ~l r . .rack \Villiams, whose business is house 
moving, stated that he had been engaged in house 
moving and changing the fronts of buildings 
along \"an Buren Street and vicinity for quite 
a while; that he had moved a number of buildings 
back: that he was familiar with the cost of such 
work~ that at the request of the highway depart-
ment he had figured upon the cost of repairing 
the store building and the service station on de-
fendant's lots and placing them in as good con-
dition as they were originally. He estimated the 
total for such work to be $1,242.10, segregated 
as follows: Removing and replacing everything 
in connection with the gas station, $320.7 5; re-
conditioning the front of the story building, 
$481.85; extending the back of the building, so 
that it woulrl be its original length, $439.50. This 
is the lowest estimate of the cost of repairing 
nnrl reconrlitioning the store building and service 
station and, when added to the value of the land 
at $135, the lowest value placed thereon, would 
be $1,377.10. Thus, according to the evidence 
of plaintiff's own witnesses, the verdict was 
$117.:!7 less than defendant should have re-
covered." 
The court also said, on page 192, as follows: 
''For the reason that the verdict and judgment 
are insufficient under the evidence, and the error 
in admitting evidence, the judgment of the lower 
court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with 
directions that the defendant be granted a new 
trial." 
17 
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In the n1atter of the State Highway Commission ,.s. 
Srste1n Investment Corporation, a Wyoming case de-
cided .1\fay 3, 1961, found in 361 P2d 528, we have a 
situation that is a little different insofar as the taking 
is concerned. The Wyoming laws provide for the ap-
pointn1ent of cmnmissioners to make a return to the 
court and then there is a petition to file to confirm 
the report. The court, under the statute, had authority 
to confirn1 the report or disaffirm it and appoint new 
cmnmissioners if it deemed it proper. However, the 
court in that instance, like the lower court, did in the 
case before this court, took it upon itself to make its 
own Findings and Decree, except in the 'Vyoming case 
the increase was very substantial. This 'Vyoming case 
carefully reYiewed the contention of the appellant, page 
5;; 1, righthand column, as follows: 
" ... They contend that the trial judge had 
no power to personally increase or decrease the 
a ''"ard of the com1nissioners. In other words, they 
contend that the court in itself increasing the 
award acted in excess of its jurisdiction ... " 
.A.gain on page 532, lefthand column, we have: 
"The textwriters and other writers seem to be 
agreed that the trial judge has no power to in-
crease or decrease the award of the con1missioners 
except by express statutory authority. 1-\n anno· 
tation on the subject is contained in 61 A.L.R. 
194, where the writer states at P. 195: 
'In the absence of clearly stated statutory 
authoritY, the trial court does not haYe the 
right g~nerall~~ to increase or decrease the 
18 
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amount of an award granted by comn1issioners 
or a jury of viewers.' 
"In .) Xichols, Eminent Domain, p. 72 (3d 
ed.) the author says: 
'Generallv. however, in the absence of ex-
pres-; statut~ry authority the trial court is with-
out power to increase or diminish the amount 
of the award as determined by the jury or by 
' COllli111SSlOners .... 
"The author cites casrs from eleyen different 
jurisdictions. It is stated in Jahr, Eminent Do-
main. p. 402 ( 1953) : 
'In the absence of statutory authority, the 
court has no power to modify an a ward con-
tained in the report of the commissioners. 
The court's power is generally limited to con-
tirnlation or rejection ... ' 
"The saUl<"' rulr was laid down in 1\'lills, Emi-
nent Domain, Art. 246 ( 2d ed.), as early as 
1888. To the same effect is 18 Am. J ur., Emi-
nent Domain, Art. 366 (1938). The cases cited 
h,· these authorities we think sustain the state-
ments made by them,. Apparently our statute 
was taken from Missouri. In the case of Missis-
sippi River Bridge Co. vs. Ring, 58 Mo. 491, 
495, 496, it appears that the trial court attempted 
to reduce the award made by the commissioners. 
The court stated: 
' ... I think the statute does not warrant 
such a proceeding. The court may take evi-
dence to reYiew the report, to see whether it 
should be approYed~ or rejected and set aside 
and new commissioners appointed. But I can 
nowhere find that it was ever designed, that 
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upon reviewing the case upon exceptions, the 
court is authorized to make any alteration, 
either by adding to or deducting from it ... " 
The court went on further in a very exhaustive refer· 
ence to different cases on page 533, lefthand column, 
ref erring particularly to the New Mexico case of State 
ex rei. 'y eltmer Y. Taylor, 42 Nl\1 405, 79 P2d 937. 
That case cites 61 A.L.R. 194. On the same page, 
many other cases are cited, including federal and state 
cases, and on page 534, lefthand column, it states: 
"If the party condemning the land should take 
exceptions without demanding a jury, the land-
owner n1ight well prefer to have the jury pass 
on the 1natter but would have no opportunity to 
ask that. In short, we can find no sound reason 
why '\Ye should not follow the great weight of 
authority in holding that the trial judge has no 
power to increase or decrease the award of the 
commissioners. The judgment herein must, ac-
cordingly, be reversed." 
Then again, in another '"yarning case, being Colo· 
rado Interstate Gas Co. Y. Uintah Development Co., 
364 P2d 655, this being an eminent domain case, and 
calling the court's attention to the left-hand column, 
page 657, it states: 
''Turning then to a considera to in of the power 
of the court to 1nodify or change the award of 
the appraisers, it is sufficient to say that we h~ve 
yery recently dealt with this subject in an opi~wn 
written by Chief .T ustice Blume in State H1gh· 
way Commission YS. Syste1n Investment Corpo· 
ration. lVyo., 361 P2d 528, 534-535. In that 
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opinion .T us tier Blun1e pointed out that text-
writers and other writers seem to be agreed that 
the trial .i udge has no power to increase or de-
crease the a ward of the appraisers except hy 
express statutory authority. It is not necessary 
to review the authorities cited by the learned 
Chief .f ustice on that point." 
It is the contention of the writer that it makes no differ-
rmT whether it's a commission that determines the 
amount of the value of the land taken and the resulting 
damngrs or whether it's a jury so determining, a court 
~till rannot modify or change the same. On this same 
suhjt•ct, State vs. Taylor, 79 P2d 937, on page 940, 
right-hand column, it states; 
"There is no specific authority in the statute 
which authorizes the court, in passing on such 
exceptions, to substitute its judgment on the 
question of dan1ages for that of the commission-
ers: and in the absence of specific authority, the 
court's power is lin1ited to either confirming the 
report or ordering a second appraisement. That 
provision of the statute seems to have been 
adopted frmn Missouri and in passing upon the 
same question, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
in l\Iississippi River Bridge Co~ vs. Ring, 58 
was lin1ited to confirming the report, or ordering 
~Io. -t.!ll. held that the authority of the court 
a reappraisement. See annotation 61 A.L.R. 194, 
where the cases are collected." 
l find in the case of State Highway Commission vs. 
, Bloom, a South Dakota case found in 93 N.W. 2d 572, 
nnd pnrticularly on page 581, the following: 
"l~ nder the provision of the South Dakota 
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Constitution which guarantees a trial by jury 
in all actions at law it is for the jury to deter-
nline the damages to be assessed. Art. YI, Sec-
tion 6, Constitution of South Dakota. And as 
to a condemnation proceeding, Art. YI, Section 
13, of the Constitution specifically provides that: 
'Private property shall not be taken for public 
use, or damages, without just compensation as 
determined by a jury ... ' So in an action in-
volving a jury question a court may not sub-
stitute its findings for that of the jury by in-
creasing the verdict. \V alters Y. Gilham, 52 SD 
82, 216 N.\V. 854. Nor can a court in a condem-
nation action increase an inadequate award made 
by the jury. State v. Hammerquist, 67 S.D. 
"117, 293 N.\V. 539. But the province of a jury 
is not invaded when a court in the exercise of 
its judicial power determines as a matter of law 
that a Yerdict or an award is not sustained by the 
evidence or is against the law." 
Linzell vs. Ohio National Bank, 137 N.E. 2d 520, is 
a highway condemnation proceeding, and on page 522, 
starting at the left-hand column, we have: 
"The remaining assignments all relate to the 
adequacy of the verdict. An examination of the 
record on this subject reveals that the jury 
awarded the sum of $5,125.00 as compensation 
for the two buildings which were to be taken. 
The record discloses that five witnesses testified, 
all of whom appeared as experts, and placed the 
following valuations on the buildings: (I) ~Ir. 
Daley, $14,600; (2) :\Ir. Lowman, $14,000; 
(3) l\1r. French, $10,700; (4) ~Ir. 'Veiler, $10!· 
000; and (5) 1\Ir. Royer, $12,000. It therefore 
appears that the Yerdict was $4,875 less than the 
lowest expert opinion, and $9,475 less than that 
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of the highest. The finding was in con1pletc dis-
rt:>gnrd of the eYidenee, and nothing appears 
further in th<' rceord concernnig the value of 
these buildings. Tlw vnluation fixed by the jury 
falls far helo\v any rational appraisal of esti-
mated clmnages f'our~d in the ~ecord. Inadequacy 
of' damages appears to be a ground on which 
new trial may be granted. 
"ln Toledo Railways & Light Co. Y. ~Iason, 
81 Ohio St. ~63. 91 N.E. 292, 28 L.R.A., N.S., 
I :w. the syllabus provides: 
'1. In :111 action to recover damages for per-
·"ntwl injuries. a new trial may be granted on the 
ground of the inadequacy of the damages found 
hy the jury. when it appears upon the facts 
proved that the jury must have omitted to take 
into consideration smne of the elements of dam-
age properly involved in the plaintiff's claim. 
':!. On error in the circuit court to the over-
ruling of a 1notion for a new trial on the ground 
nf the inadequacy of the damages found by the 
jury for an action for personal injuries, the cir-
~uit court may reverse the judgment of the court 
') f common pleas and grant a new trial, on the 
gi'otmd that the verdict is not sustained by suf-
ficient evidence.' 
.. ( •>) The rule in Ohio 'vith reference to the 
inadequacy of verdict see1ns to be well epito-
mized in 1:3 Ohio .T uris prudence, 306, Section 
l!H, to wit: 
·, \ study of the results reached in the reported 
eases seen1s to justify the statement that the 
l'ourts generally grant relief if convinced that 
the \Trd id ~ubstantially exceeds or falls below 
anr rational appraisal ·or estimate of the danl-
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ages, even thought the inference of passion, 
prejudice, partiality or improper motive on the 
part of the jury is no 1nore natural or reason-
able than the inference of mistake or misappre-
hension on their part.' 
" ( 6) Counsel for the appellee urged that in 
considering this assignment of error the court 
should look only to the total verdict which was 
for the sum of $68,875. However, in arriving at 
this verdict the jury failed to place a proE_er 
valuation on the two buildings. Section 5519.03 
of the Revjsed Code requires that the jury make 
a separate finding of the value of the buildings. 
The Legislature must have enacted this require· 
1nent for the sale purpose of testing the general 
verdict, and if this valuation is against the mani-
fest weight of the evidence then the general 
verdict has also the same deficiency. \ V e, there· 
fore, conclude that the verdict is against the 
n1anifest weight of the evidence; the judgment 
is reversed and th cause is re1nanded for further 
proceedings according to law." 
This case is cited in detail for the reason that counsel 
for the plaintiff urged to the lower court that the court 
should look only to the total verdict and disregard the 
fact that the severance is lower than that testified to 
by any witness. Counsel urged this, even though the 
statutes require they separately determine the severance 
damages. 
In re 'Vest "\Vaite St., Seattle 155 P 165, we 
have an action in eminent domain. It appears from 
reading the case that the court furnished the jury a 
printed fonn of verdict. A judgment was entered and 
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amount paid .. Approximately one year after the verdict 
t ht-y ,J isL'( 1vcrcd an error in the verdict. A petition was 
filed alleging the verdict was in error by inadvertance 
nncl mistak<' and asked it be corrected. Upon presenta-
1 ion of the petition the court granted the same ex parte 
nnd modified the adverse judgn1ent as requested. The 
adnTst· parties, upon discovering the order and modifi-
l'ntion moved to set it aside, but on a hearing it was 
drnied and the matter was appealed. On page 166, left-
hand column, we have: 
"On the 1nerits of the controversy we are clear 
that the court was in error. The fact that the 
verdict does not conform to the evidence, or is 
rendered through mistake and inadvertence, is a 
cause for setting aside the verdict, or, if not dis-
co,·ered until after judgn1ent is entered, is a 
cause for setting aside both the verdict and 
judgn1ent, but it does not give the court power 
to correct the verdict. The verdict is the jury's, 
not the court's, and the court's power in such 
cases is limited to seeing that the jury return 
a verdict correct in form and substance. It may 
not. after the verdict has been returned and the 
jm·y discharged, change it, over the objection of 
either of the parties, in matter of substance." 
l l n the Houston Lighting and Power Company vs. 
Adams. 309 S,\ .. 2d 537, this was a case in eminent 
domain. It appears fron1 reading the case that the jury 
became hopelessly mixed up and entered some verdicts 
that were incorrect. The court then took it upon itself 
1 to correct the verdicts by remittitur and we find on page 
~ .143, the following: 
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'''V e think in the case here that we not only 
haYe the question of excessiveness, but we have 
the question of the right of the trial judge to 
substitute his finding for that of the jury, which 
is contrary to our judicial history, where testi-
mony of probative force is tendered on the issue. 
His duty is to grant a new trial. \V e do not think 
our views are in conflict with World Oil Co. rs. 
Hicks, 129 Tex. Civ. App., 75 S.W. 2d 905. 
See also Dallais Ry. & Tern1inal Co. vs. Farns-
worth, 148 Tex. 584, 227 S.,V. 2d 1017." 
This Texas case is cited for the reason that it was very 
plain in the Texas case that an error through misunder· 
standing on the part of the jury had been made and the 
court decided to take it upon itself to correct that error 
and substitute its opinion. This is exactly what the court 
has done in our case. The jury's figures are below the 
n1inimu1n testified to by any witness. The court has taken 
it upon itself, by the theory of additur, to add sufficient 
amounts of money to the verdicts to bring them up to 
the minimu1n testi1nony. This is not a jury verdict but 
rather the court's verdict that has been substituted by 
the court attempting to usurp the power and function 
of the jury. It is entirely wrong and contrary to any 
principal of equity and justice and the statutes of the 
State of Utah. It was an expedient solution by which 
the court attempted to avoid hearing the cases over 
again. If a jury refuses to follow the instructions and 
the evidence and brings in a verdict which is outside of 
the evidence entirely, then, a new trial should be grant· 
ed. Briefs were presented to the court and there was 
not one case presented in favor of the Porcupine Res· 
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ervoir Company saying that in eminent domain pro-
ceedings where they take the property away from the 
p<'ople by a statutory proceedings, that additur is 
proper~ yet numerous citations were given from other 
states where additur in such cases was not proper. 
\\r <' belieYe the court erred and did not give this 
th(' judicial determination it should have had. Our 
court tries a great nun1her of cases in the First District, 
nnd it is overloaded. Our judge has an ability to get 
i. the decision t•endered and the case disposed of. How-
t''·er, when mistakes like this are made they should be 
t looked squarely in the face. When property is taken 
~ nway from smneone against their will, speed an~ the 
1~ necessity of completing the court calendar should have 
re no bearing. Everything possible should be done to 
L prevent inequity and injustice. 
Qi 
~ The case of 'Villiamson County v. Brock, 10 N.E. 
It :!d 654, is another case where the jury disregarded the 
~evidence and returned a verdict for less than any sum 
~ testified to. The trial court failed to grant a motion for 
W n new trial. The appellant court said in the righthand 
, column of page 655, as follows: i,. 
rf 
· · c· nless the verdict of a jury, in a condemna-
tion proceedings, appears to have been the result 
nf passion or prejudice, or of a clear and palp-
able mistake. it will not be disturbed where the 
amount fixed is within the range of the evidence 
and the jury has viewed the premises. Forest 
Preserve Dish'ict Y. Dearlove, 337 Ill.,}5.55, 169 
X. E. 7.>:1. But where the jury disregards the 
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testitnony and awards an atnount that is either 
excessiYe or too small, as shown by the testimony 
of the witnesses, we have not hesitated to set such 
Yerdicts aside. Super-Power Co. Ys. Sommers, 
352 Ill., 610, 186 N.E. 476. This verdict and 
judgment for $15 for land taken were in total 
disregard of the testin1ony. The court erred in 
denying the motion of appellant for a new trial." 
The case of Th1eyers Y. City of Daytona Beach, 30 
S2d 35,J., is another example of where the jury dis-
regards the evidence and returns a verdict for less than 
the testitnony of any witness. On page 355, the right· 
hand colun1n, we have: 
"As to Parcel #15, the verdict was for $360 
·whereas the lowest Yalue fixed by any witness 
,yas $400. The award falls far short of full com· 
pensation and must be reversed. The award must 
be sustained by evidence. The jurors may riew 
the property and use their judgment in evaluat· 
ing the evidence, but, no matter how learned they 
tnay be, they are not at liberty to disregard the 
evidence." 
POINT I'r 
TIIAT IF ADDITUR \VERE PROPER, 
THE COURT, BY ITS PROCEDURE AND AP· 
PLICATION 1\CTED ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY A_ND \YITH UTTER DISRE· 
GARD OF THE E'riDENCE AND SUCH AC· 
TION ''TAS AND IS .A.NALGOUS TO A QUO· 
TIENT VERDICT. 
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\\"hen the court decided not to grant a new trial, 
1t had rc·ct'ived l he memorandum of plaintiff ( R. 97-
tO:!). In this memoranrum and on the fifth page thereof 
l'ounsrl for plain tift' said: 
",\ lso it should be noted that the seYeran~e 
damage ligure in the Keller case is only $664.00 
lower than that of the lowest figure of an expert, 
and in the A von case the severance damage 
ligurc is only $158.00 lower than that of ~lr. 
Palmer." 
Thr court, without eYen checking these figures, said in 
his mrmorandum of decision (R. 10-J.-105): 
"The order n1a~· be that unless the plaintiff, 
wit h[n ten dn~·s from today, consents that sepa-
rate ,·erdic1s as to Keller and Avon may be in-
creased h~· $664.00 and by $158.00 respectively, 
the motion for n new trial 1nay be granted." 
The plaintifl' inunediately had a consent to additur 
~·prepared and signed by the plaintiff (R. 106), which 
IM reads. in part, as follows: 
"l'omes now the plaintiff above named and 
consents to the increase of the verdict respecting 
the Lloyd ,Y. 1\:eller Corporation to the extent 
of ~t1li-LOO and consents to the increase in the 
verdict in favor of the Avon Land and Livestock 
Company to the extent of $158.00." 
\m,·. if the court will check the testimony of Alden 
. \dams (Ex. 43a and ~3b) relating to the Keller Cor-
:( poration. it can be seen that his opinion as to severance 
~ rlamage was ~:1,88~.20. This was the lowest testimonv 
1
v nf any witness relating to the Keller Corporation se~-
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erance dan1age. The testimony of Marcellus Palmc1 
(Ex. 57) relating to the Keller seYcrance damage wa~ 
the next lowest testi1nony and was foT $1,855.~5 sever· 
ance. The jury verdict for Keller damage was $3,200.00. 
Hence we haYe the court's theory of additur: 
$3,200.00 
$+664.00 
$3,864.00 
Jury's verdict 
Additur 
Judge's verdict 
Then to go one step further: 
$3,884.20 
-$3,864.00 
$ 20.20 
Lowest testimony 
Judge's verdict 
Amount by which Judge's 
verdict is under lowest 
testimony. 
The important point to be gained from this computa-
tion is not the mnount by which the judge's verdict was 
below the lowest testimony, but rather, the obvious error 
in the manner used to arrive at a fair value based on the 
theory of additur. The value added was the figure used 
in the plaintiff's memorandum. It was intended to bring 
the verdict up to the lowest a1nount testified to by any 
witness. The figure used was obviously an error made 
by the counsel for the plaintiff and was carried into 
effect by the court. If a fair and careful evaluation of 
the evidence was 1nade h~- the court, then why was not 
the error corrected? If the court was going to accept 
the testimony of one witness oYer another in the one 
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case it would seem more consistent to accept the san1e 
witness's testimony in both cases. IIowever, this \vas 
not done. In the A von Land and Livestock Company 
rase, Alden Adan1s' testimony as to severance was 
nearly $300.00 more than the testimony of either Barlow 
or Palmer (Ex. ~:la, ~2b, :3~·. 34a, 3-t.b and 58) but the 
increase allowed by the court was simply up to the low-
, . .,, testimony given by any witness. 
The situation may be reversed and the court could 
hnrf accepted the testimony of Palmer and Barlow if 
lw had recein'd a judicial impression as to the accurate-
ness nf their testin1ony, in which event the theory of 
:ulditur would ha,·e resulted in the following in the 
Keller case: 
(I) $4,855.20 Palmer's severance (Ex. 57) 
3,200.00 Jury's verdict 
$1,655.20 Proper additur 
or, 
~ 
(:?) $8.250.00 Barlow's severance (Ex. 35a) 
$3,200.00 Jury's verdict 
$5,050.00 Proper additur 
rThe court did not exercise reasonable judgment or 
~thrre would have been some consistency in whose testi-
Jmony was to be followed. 
, X ow. isn't the reason why a quotient verdict is 
frowned upon because it takes away the J. udmnent of 
I • o 
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the jury and reduces it to a 1nere mechanical operation 
That is, add all the figures and divide the total by the 
number testifying to arrive at your verdict. Doesn'l 
it give the same kind of n1echanical result to say thal 
I will take the lo,vest figure without regard to who, 01 
how many, different parties 1night haYe to be con· 
sidered to get the lowest testimony ? This is, in the 
opinion of the writer, arriving at a mechanical verdict 
and is, in theory, si1nilar to a quotient verdict. Opinions 
of experts can vary so greatly on the same subject 
matter, for instance, see the schedule of testimony under 
Point 1 I. page 7 of this brief, for the difference in 
severance dan1age as testified to on the Summers' 
property, behveen plaintiff's own witnesses, Alden 
Adams and ~-:Iarcellus Palmer. One is $5,184.00 and 
the other is $2,009.00; percentagewise a difference of 
about 150lj'o. Yet, these are the two parties the court 
wishes to take the lowest figures from on the severance 
damage on its theory of additur. 
POINTV 
THAT THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
REQUIRED DEFENDANTS TO 'y AIYE IX· 
TEREST BEFORE GRANTING A POST· 
PONE~fENT OF THE TRIAL DATE. (SAID 
POSTPONEJ.VIENT OF TRIAL DATE \VAS 
REQUESTED FOR THE REASON A KEY 
'VITNESS 'VAS A STATE SENATOR AXD 
'VOULD BE ATTENDING A SESSION OF 
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'fHl~ LEGISL.\TURE AT THE TI~IE SET 
FOR TRI~\L). 
Plaintifl' had received an order of the court grant-
ing it possession of the property and pursuant to said 
poss('ssion had converted the same into a reservoir, ex-
duding the defendants en I irely frmn the property. 
rnder the> statutes of the State of TTtah and particu-
l:arly Scdion 78-34-11, U.C.A., 1953, which reads as 
follows: 
"JJ,.heu right to damages deemed to .have ac-
aueds-For the purpose of assessing cmnpensa-
tion and damages, the right thereto shall be 
deemed to have accrued at the date of the service 
of sun1mons and its actual value at that date shall 
he the measure of compensation for all property 
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages 
to property not actually taken, but injuriously 
affected, in all cases where such damages are 
allowed. as provided in the next proceeding sec-
tion. No improvements put upon the property 
subsequent to the date of service of sununons 
shall be included in the assessment of compen-
sation or damages." 
In checking 1 11 A.L.R. 1304, as to interest in 
!eminent domain proceedings, these cases seem to hold 
;that the interest is a part of the just compen.Yation guar-
:mteerl by the C' onstitutions of the various states, which 
prohibits the taking of priYate property for public use 
·without just cmnpensation. In this particular case the 
court said (R. 233) : 
. '· . . . ~n the other hand, the court has toyed 
w1th the 1dea. )lr. Skeen, that if you wanted to 
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try the condemnation case first, the court had 
in mind, was toying with the idea of making a 
conditional order permitting a continuance pro-
viding they waive the accrual of interest beyond 
that date." 
Again (R. 234) we have: 
"THE COL~R T: \V ell, now, what do you 
say, 1\ir. Mann? You'll get a continuance in 
your condemnation case. We'll lift out of the 
partition suit that part that's under the water 
and appoint referees to try and go out and see 
if they can divide what's left. If they can't, then 
the court will, under the statute, order a sale of 
what's left for cash. 
MR. Sl{EEN: If the court please, I wonder 
if we could confer for five minutes with our 
clients. I'd like to. 
THE COURT: \Vhat I've said, gentlemen, 
you'll understand is subject to modification. I'm 
merely trying to get over this situation. All right. 
Now, if you -want to insist on the condemnation 
r will ask them to waive the interest. If you in· 
sist on the partition, then I propose to lift out 
of the partition suit that which is under condem· 
nation. \Y e'll take a ten minute recess." 
Again, ( R. 239-240) we have: 
''THE COURT: Now I will rule on the evi· 
dence, assu1ning that I'm still in the case as of 
that ti1ne, based on what authorities you dig ou~. 
So what do we do now? \Ve continue the parb· 
tion case, suspend-
~IR. SKEEN: Suspend the interest. 
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)IR. )IAXN: Let's have an understanding 
on the interest. The interest will be suspended 
and let's get it in the record, frmn March fifth 
to ~lay first. 
Till~~ l'OlTR'f: That's all right. 
~IR. SKEEN: Yes. 
~IR. Jl, \.N N: llecause that's the only differ-
cmT that you can be out anything." 
~ow. the titne involved is a short period and the 
amount 111' interest is a small amount, but I ask this 
•1urstion: \\'hy should the court take away just co·m-
Jlfllsttlion from a property owner who is having his land 
takt'll away frmu hin1 against his will, in favor of the 
party who is seeking to take the property and has been 
in actual possession of the Saine and is using it as his 
nwn. and hasn't paid a thing for it? The defendants 
arc only seeking a few weeks' continuance from the 
trial date so as to have the services of an expert at the 
trial. The expert is a State Senator and the Senate is 
and will be in session at the time set for the trial. All 
counsel was doing was asking that the matter be con-
tinued until the session was over and the Senator would 
then be available to give his testimony. It takes many 
weeks for an expert to accumulate his data. It takes 
many ,·iews of the premises. The expense to the litigant 
for the services of an expert witness can run into $100.00 
per da)·· The interest involved for the period of time 
in question would not equal the expense the defendants 
woulrl he out. if they had abandoned the services of 
the expert who was prepared and ready to testify. But 
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to seek another expert and escort him through and orer 
the project and get him ready for the trial setting would 
be next to impossible. 'Ve believe that when justice 
demands a continuance, the court should not take awa~· 
Just compensation from the defendants involved and 
actually give it to the plaintiff. 'Ve think the court 
erred. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in failing to grant defendants' 
motion for a new trial. There is absolutely no power 
vested, or authority granted, either statutory or other· 
wise, whereby the court has the right to apply the theory 
of additur in an e1ninent domain proceedings. The 
Constitution of the State of Utah gives the defendants 
a right to a trial by jury. The defendants exercised this 
right, and the jury com1nitted error. Therefore, de· 
fendants are entitled to a new trial with a new jury. 
'Vhen these errors are combined with the requir.ements 
by the court that all three cases be tried together and 
that interest be waived under the circumstances set 
forth herein, all in the aggregate, resulted in a miscar· 
riage of justice. 'Ve sincerely believe that all three 
defendants are entitled to a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter G. Mann 
Reed 'V. Hadfield 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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